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D e a r Ms. Noonan:
In accordance with Rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, I am advising the court of a significant decision that
was made recently by the United State Supreme Court in the case
of Maislin Industries vs. Primary Steel, Inc. . 58 U. S. L. W. 4862
(June 21, 1990).
This case pertains to the points made by
Appellant at pages 24 through 28 of its Brief and by Respondent
at pages 9 through 14 and 21 through 30 of its Brief. A copy of
the Maislin case is attached for the court' s convenience.
Very truly yours,
COHNE, RAPPAPORT^ SEGAL, P. C.

Leslie Van Frank
Attorney for Respondent
LVF: cp
cc:
Peter Guyon
Attorney for appellant
(w/encl. )
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Accordingly, I concur in the Court's judgment, but not in
its opinion.
CHARLES A. PALMER, Texas Assistant Attorney General (JIM
MATTOX, Atty. Gen., MARY F. KELLER, First Asst. Atty. Gen.,
S. MICHAEL BOZARTH, Asst. Attv. Gen., and MICHAEL P.
HODGE, Asst. Atty. Gen., on the briefs) for petitioner; JON R.
FARRAR, Huntsville, Texas for respondent.

No. 89-624
MAISLIN INDUSTRIES, U. S., INC., ET AL., PETITIONE R S u PRIMARY S T E E L , INC.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
Isyllabus
No. 89-624. Argued April 16, 1990-Decided June 21, 1990
The Interstate Commerce Act (Act) requires motor common carriers to
publish their rates in tariffs filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), 49 U. S. C. § 10762, and prohibits both carriers and shippers
from deviating from those rates, § 10761. The Act also specifies that a
carrier's rates must be nondiscriminatory, § 10741, and that its rates and
practices must be reasonable, § 10701, and charges the ICC, upon determining that a rate or practice violates the statute, with prescribing the
rate or practice to be followed, § 10704(b)(1). Purportedly pursuant to
this authority, the ICC, in its recent Negotiated Rates decisions, has
adopted a policy that relieves a shipper of the obligation to pay the filed
rate when it has privately negotiated a lower rate with the carrier.
From 1981 to 1983, Quinn Freight Lines, a motor common carrier and a
subsidiary of petitioner Maislin Industries, U. S., Inc., privately negotiated interstate shipment rates with respondent Primary Steel, Inc., that
were lower than Quinn's filed rates. Quinn never filed the negotiated
rates with the ICC. In 1983, Maislin filed for bankruptcy, and the bankrupt estate issued balance due bills to Primary for the difference between the filed rates and the negotiated rates. When Primary refused
to pay the undercharges, the estate brought suit in the District Court,
which referred the matter to the ICC. Rejecting the argument that it
lacked the statutory power to release a shipper from liability for such
undercharges, the ICC relied on its Negotiated Rates policy to hold that
§ 10701 authorized it to consider all the circumstances surrounding an undercharge suit to determine whether collection of the filed rate would
constitute an unreasonable practice. The ICC concluded that Maislin
was not entitled to recover, since Quinn and Primary had negotiated
other rates, and since Primary had relied on Quinn to file those rates,
had reasonably believed that the amounts quoted and billed were the
correct total charges, and had made full payment. The case returned to
the District Court, which granted summary judgment for Primary on the
basis of the ICC's decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing
with the District Court that the approach taken by the ICC was consists
ent with the Act.
Held: The ICC's Negotiated Rates policy is inconsistent with the Act and
is therefore invalid.
(a) Since the duty to file rates under § 10762 and the obligation to
charge only those rates under § 10761 have always been considered essential to preventing price discrimination violative of § 10741, Arizona
Grocery Co. v. Alchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 284 U. S. 370, 384, this
Court has long held that the filed rate alone governs the legal rights of a
shipper against a carrier, see, e. g., Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern
R. Co., 260 U. S. 156, 163, and that the statute forbids equitable defenses to collection of the filed tariff, see, e. g., Texas & Pacific R. Co. v.
Mugg, 202 U. S. 242, 245, including the shipper's ignorance or the carrier's misquotation of rates, see, e. g., Louisville <£ Nashville R. Co. v.
Maxwell, 237 U. S. 94, 97. Despite its sometimes harsh effects, this
rigid "filed rate doctrine" has been strictly applied and consistently adhered to by the Court. See, e. g., Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., 460 U. S. 533, 535.
(b) Although, under the filed rate doctrine, the tariff rate is not enforceable if the ICC finds it to be unreasonable, see, e. g., Maxwell,
supra, at 97, that exception is not applicable here. The ICC's determination that a carrier engages in an "unreasonable practice" when it attempts to collect the filed rate after the parties have negotiated a lower
rate is not entitled to deference, since it conflicts with this Court's interpretation, from which Congress has not diverged, that the secret negoti-
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ation and collection of rates lower than the filed rate is discriminatory
under § 10741. See, e. g., Avmmir Packing Co. v. United States, 209
U. S. 56, 81. Stripped of its semantic cover, the Negotiated Rates policy and, more specifically, the ICC's interpretation of "unreasonable
practices," thus stand revealed as flatly inconsistent with the Act's
scheme as a whole and §§ 10761 and 10762 in particular. Nor can the
ICC's policy be justified on the ground that it prevents the carrier from
receiving a windfall, i.e., the higher filed rate, from its failure to comply
with § 10762's directive to file the negotiated rate, since such "equities"
are irrelevant to the application of § 10761, which requires the carrier to
collect thefiledrate. Compliance with §§ 10761 and 10762 is utterly central to the administration of the Act, and, by sanctioning adherence to
unfiled rates, the Negotiated Rates policy effectively renders those sections nugatory and conflicts directly with the Act's core purposes.
(c) The passage of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 (MCA)—which substantially deregulated the motor carrier industry for the avowed purpose
of promoting competitive and efficient transportation services—does not
justify the ICC's Negotiated Rates policy. Although the ICC has both
the authdrity and the expertise generally to adopt new policies when
faced with new developments in the industry, its power does not extend
to a policy that directly conflicts with its governing statute. Nothing in
the MCA repeals §§ 10761 and 10762, and generalized congressional exhortations to "increase competition" cannot provide the ICC authority to
alter the requirements of those sections as interpreted by this Court.
Cf. Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Traffic Bureau, Inc., 476 U. S.
409, 420. The fact that, even before the MCA's passage, Congress had
allowed the ICC to exempt motor contmct carriers from the requirement
that they adhere to the published tariff, see § 10761(b), demonstrates
that Congress is aware of the requirement and has deliberately chosen
not to disturb it with respect to motor common carriers.
879 F. 2d 400, reversed and remanded.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE,
MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined.
SCALIA, J., filed a concurring opinion. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., joined.
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under the Interstate Commerce Act (Act), 49 U. S. C.
§ 10101 et seq. (1982 ed.), motor common carriers must file
their rates with the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC
or Commission), and both carriers and shippers must adhere
to these rates. This case requires us to determine the validity of a policy recently adopted by the ICC that relieves a
shipper of the obligation of paying the filed rate when the
shipper and carrier have privately negotiated a lower rate.
We hold that this policy is inconsistent with the Act.
I
A
The ICC regulates interstate transportation by motor common carriers to ensure that rates are both reasonable and
nondiscriminatory.
See 49 U. S. C. §§ 10101(a), 10701(a)
10741(b) (1982 ed.). The Act provides that a "common carrier . . . may not subject a person, place, port, or type of traffic to unreasonable discrimination." § 10741. In addition,
the Act states that "fa] rate . . . , classification, rule, or practice related to transportation or service . . . must be reasonable." § 10701(a).1. The ICC has primary responsibility for
determining whether a rate or practice is reasonable. See
Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S.
426, 440-442 (1907). Thfe Commission may investigate the
reasonableness of a rate "on its own initiative or on complaint." § 11701(a). When the Commission determines that
a rate or practice violates the statute, it "shall prescribe the
rate . . . or practice to be followed." § 10704(b)(1). Moreover, motor common carriers are liable "for damages result1
The Act states that when reviewing the reasonableness of a carrier's
rates, the Commission "shall authorize revenue levels that are adequate
under honest, economical, and efficient management to cover total operating expenses . . . plus a reasonable profit." 49 U. S. C. § 10701(e) (1982
ed.) [footnote omitted].

6-19-90

The United States LAW WEEK

5 8 LW 4 8 6 3

ing from the imposition.of rates for transportation or service
that it had authority under § 10701 to determine whether the
the Commission finds to be in violation" of the Act. 49
collection of the undercharge in a particular case would conU. S. C. § 11705(b)(3) (1982 ed., Supp. V).
stitute an unreasonable practice. Id., at 103.'
The Act requires a motor common carrier to "publish and
The ICC clarified its new policy in NITL—Petition to Instifile with the Commission tariffs containing the rates for
tute Rulemaking on Negotiated Motor Common Carrier
transportation it may provide." 49 U. S. C. § 10762(a)(1) Rates, 5 I. C. C. 2d 623 (1989) (Negotiated Rates II). The
(1982 ed.). The Act also specifically prohibits a carrier from
Commission explained that its policy did not recognize "eqproviding services at any rate other than the filed (also
uitable defenses" but rather applied the "affirmative statuknown as tariff) rate:
tory requirement] and obligatio[n]" of § 10701 that a carrier's
practices be reasonable.
Id., at 631, n. 18.4 "[T]he Com"Except as provided in this subtitle, a carrier providmission is finding to be an unreasonable practice . . . a course
ing transportation or service subject to the jurisdiction
of the Interstate Commerce Commission . . . shall pro- of conduct consisting of: (1) negotiating a rate; (2) agreeing to
vide that transportation or service only if the rate for the a rate that the shipper reasonably relies upon as being lawfully filed; (3) failing, either willfully or otherwise, to publish
transportation or service is contained in a tariff that is in
the rate; (4) billing and accepting payment at the negotiated
effect under this subchapter. That carrier may not
rate for (sometimes) numerous shipments; and (5) then decharge or receiv^ a different compensation for that
transportation orTservice than the rate specified in the manding additional payment at higher rates." Id., at 628,
tariff whether by returning a part of that rate to a per- n. 11.
B
son, giving a person a privilege, allowing the use of a
facility that affects the value of that transportation or
This case involves the application of the Commission's new
service, or another device." § 10761(a).
Negotiated Rates policy. It arises from an action by petiDeviation from the filed rate may result in the imposition of
tioner Maislin Industries, U. S., Inc. (Maislin), to recover
civil or criminal sanctions on the carrier or shipper. See
freight undercharges for 1,081 interstate shipments per§§11902-11904.2
formed for a shipper, respondent Primary Steel (Primary),
As the Court has frequently stated, the statute does not by petitioner's subsidiary, Quinn Freight Lines (Quinn).
permit either a shipper's ignorance or the carrier's misquota- From 1981 to 1983, Quinn, a motor common carrier certifition of the applicable rate to serve as a defense to the collec- cated by the ICC, privately negotiated rates with Primary
tion of the filed rate. See SoutJiem Pacific Transp. Co. v. that were lower than Quinn's rates then on file with the ICC.
Commercial Metals Co., 456 U. S. 336, 352 (1982); Louisville Quinn never filed the negotiated rates with the ICC.
& Nashville R. Co. v. Maxwell, 237 U. S. 94, 97 (1915). In
In 1983, Maislin filed for bankruptcy, and a postpetition
1986, however, the ICC concluded that changes in the motor audit of its accounts revealed undercharges of $187,923.36 recarrier industry "clearly warrant a tempering of the former sulting from billing Primary at the negotiated rather than
harsh rule of adhering to the tariff rate in virtually all cases." filed rates. The agents of the bankrupt estate, pursuant to
NITL—Petition to Institute Rulemaking on Negotiated
the authorization of the bankruptcy court, issued balance due
Motor Common Carrier Rates, 3 I. C. C. 2d 99, 106 (1986) bills to Primary for these undercharges. When Primary re(Negotiated Rates I). Under the new policy, when cases are fused to pay the amounts demanded, the estate brought suit
referred to the Commission, it "decid[es] if the collection of in the United States District Court for the Western District
undercharges would be an unreasonable practice." Id., at of Missouri under 49 U. S. C. § 11706(a) (1982 ed.) s for the
100.
difference between the filed rates and the negotiated rates.
In its answer, Primary alleged that since the parties had
In Negotiated Rates I, the Commission adverted to a growing trend in the motor carrier industry whereby carriers and negotiated lower rates, rebilling at the tariff rates would conshippers negotiate rates lower than those on file with the stitute an unreasonable practice in violation of § 10701; that
ICC and the shippers are billed for and remit payment at the the tariff rates themselves were not '"reasonable" within the
negotiated rate. In many instances, however, the negoti- meaning of § 10701; and that the asserted tariff rates were
ated rate is never filed with the ICC. In some of those
cases, the carrier subsequently files for bankruptcy and the
'The Commission stated that its new policy did not "abrogate Section
trustee bills the shipper for the difference between the tariff
10761. Rather we emphasize that carriers must continue to charge the
rate and the negotiated rate, arguing that § 10761 compels tariff rate as provided in the statute. The issue here is simply whether
we have the authority to consider all the circumstances surrounding an unthe collection of the filed rather than negotiated rate. Id., at
99. The Commission concluded that, under such circum- dercharge suit." NITL—Petition to Institute Rulemaking on Negotiated
stances, "it could be fundamentally unfair not to consider a Motor Common Carrier Rates, 3 I. C. C. 2d 99, 103 (1986) (citations omitted). The Commission rejected a proposal by the National Industrial
shipper's equitable defenses to a claim for undercharges." Transportation League (NITL) that would have declared the negotiated
Id., at 103. The Commission reasoned that the passage of rate to be the maximum reasonable rate. The Commission concluded that
the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, which significantly dereguthe proposal conflicted with § 10761 because it created a "per se determination that, as a matter of law, the negotiated rate would apply." Id., at
lated the motor carrier industry, justified the change in
policy, for the new competitive atmosphere made strict appli- 102.
* The Commission stated: "[Ojur Negotiated Rates policy doec not. eprecation of §10761 unnecessary to deter discrimination. 3 sent
a relaxed interpretation of § 10761, but rather a separate determinaI. C. C. 2d, at 106. Moreover, the Commission asserted
tion under § 10701. But even if it were viewed as a reinterpretation of a
1
Section 11902 provides that a shipper who knowingly receives a rebate
or offset against thefiledrate is liable to the government for a civil penalty
in an amount equal to three times the rebate. See §11902. Section
11903(a) states that any person who "knowingly offers, grants, gives, solicits, accepts, or receives" service at less than the filed rate "shall befinedat
least $1,000 but not more than $20,000, imprisoned for not more than 2
years, or both." A carrier who willfully fails tofileand publish its tariffs is
subject to the same penalty. See § 11903(b); see also § 11904 (corporate
liability).

previously strict construction of § 10761, it would be . . . well within tMs
agency's authority (and indeed duty) to reinterpret the Interstate Commerce Act, based on upon experience gained and changing circumstances."
NITL—Petition to Institute Rulemaking on Negotiated Motor Common
Carrier Rates, 5 I. C. C. 2d 623, 631 (1989) (citing American Trucking
Assn., Inc. v. Atchison- T. & S. F. R. Co., 387 U. S. 397, 416 (1967)).
•Section 11706(a) provides:
"A common carrier providing transportation or service subject to the ji
risdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission . . . must begin a civ
action to recover charges for transportation or service provided by the ca
rier within 3 years after the claim accrues."
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otherwise inapplicable to the shipments at issue. The District Court, finding these matters to be within the primary
jurisdiction of the ICC, stayed the proceeding at Primary's
request and referred the case to the Commission. App. 6-8.
The ICC ruled in Primary's favor, rejecting Maislin's argument that the Commission lacked the statutory power to
release a shipper from liability for such undercharges. Relying on Negotiated Rates I, the ICC reiterated that § 10701 authorized it to "consider all the circumstances surrounding an
undercharge suit" to determine whether collection of the filed
rate would constitute an unreasonable practice.
App. to
Pet. for Cert. 35a. In the Commission's view, its role was
"to undertake an analysis of whether a negotiated but unpublished rate existed, the circumstances surrounding assessment of the tariff rate, and any other pertinent facts." Id.,
at 36a. With respect to the instant controversy, the ICC
concluded that Quinn and Bt-imary had negotiated rates other
than the tariff rates* and that Primary had relied on Quinn to
file the rates with the ICC.T "Primary reasonably believed
that the amounts quoted and billed by Quinn were the correct
total charges for the transportation services it performed,
that the amounts were reached as the result of negotiations
between Primary and Quinn, and that, since full payment
was made by [Primary]," Maislin was not entitled to recover
the filed rates. Id., at 43a.
The case returned to the District Court where both parties
moved for summary judgment. The court granted summary
judgment for Primary, rejecting Maislin's argument that the
ICC's new policy was, in effect, an impermissible recognition
of equitable defenses to the application of the filed rate. The
District Court concluded that the ICC's policy of determining
case by case whether the collection of undercharges would be
an unreasonable practice under § 10701 was based on a permissible construction of the Act. 705 F. Supp. 1401,
1405-1406 (1988). The court also determined that the ICC's
finding that Maislin had engaged in an unreasonable practice
was supported by substantial evidence. Id., at 1406-1407.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed,
agreeing that the approach taken by the ICC was consistent
with the Act. The court reasoned that "[s]ection 10761(a),
which mandates the collection of tariff rates, is only part of
an overall regulatory scheme administered by the ICC, and
there is no provision in the [Act] elevating this section over
section 10701, which requires that tariff rates be reasonable."
879 F. 2d 400, 405 (1989). The court concluded: "[T]he
' See App. to Pet. for Cert. 36a-38a. The Commission relied primarily
on two "rate sheets" to find that negotiated rates existed. According to
the Commission, a three-page rate sheet prepared by Primary in 1981 demonstrated that Quinn, through its agent James McGowan, had negotiated a
five percent across-the-board increase in rates above those in Quint's tariff
on file with the ICC. Sometime in 1982, when Primary notified Quinn that
it would need relief, from the rates in order to continue using Quinn, the
parties orally negotiated a decrease in the rates. Primary prepared a new
rate sheet which was sent to all the relevant individuals. Subsequently,
whenever rates were needed for destinations other than those shown on
the rate sheet, McGowan would set a new ra:e based on the mileage involved. The ICC concluded that "there is evidence of offers, acceptances,
and approvals by the involved parties" before each of the shipments in
question. Id., at 36a; see also id. at 38a.
T
See id., at 43a. This finding was based on the fact that McGowan represented that his superiors had approved the rates on the written rate
sheets. See id., at 40a. The Commission noted that Primary's representative was never given an actual tariff documenting that the agreed upon
rates had been filed with ICC and that Primary's representative had no
training with respect to tariffs, but the Commission concluded that the representative "understood that Quinn would do whatever was necessary to
implement the agreed upon rates." Id., at 32a. The Commission specifically found that "[wjhile Quinn may not have taken appropriate steps to
legalize the quoted rates, it has not been demonstrated that this occurred
as a result of any intent to engage in unlawful conduct." Id., at 42a.
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proper authority to harmonize these competing provisions is
the ICC. . . . The approach taken by the ICC does not abolish
the filed rate doctrine, but merely allows the ICC to consider
all of the circumstances, including equitable defenses, to determine if strict adhei^ence to the filed rate doctrine would
constitute an unreasonable practice." Ibid, (citation omitted). Because the Courts of Appeals have disagreed on the
important issue of whether the ICC's Negotiated Rates policy
is consistent with the Act,6 we granted certiorari. 493 U. S.
(1990).
II
The Interstate Commerce Act requires a motor common
carrier to publish its rates in a tariff filed with the Commission. 49 U. S. C. §10762 (1982 ed.). This Court has long
understood that the filed rate governs the legal relationship between shipper and carrier. In Keogh v. Chicago <£
N&rthwe&tern R. Co., 260 U. S. 156, 163 (1922), the Court
explained:
"The legal rights of shipper as against carrier in respect
to a rate are measured by the published tariff. Unless
and until suspended or set aside, this rate is made, for all
purposes, the legal rate, as between carrier and shipper.
The rights as defined by the tariff cannot be varied or
enlarged by either contract or tort of the carrier. .. . .
This stringent rule prevails, because otherwise the paramount purpose of Congress—prevention of unjust discrimination—might be defeated." (Citations omitted.)
See Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc.,
476 U. S. 409, 415-417 (1986); Abilene Cotton Oil, 204 U. S.,
at 439; Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Mugg, 202 U. S. 242, 245
(1906); Gulf, C. •& S. F. R. Co v. Hefiey, 158 U. S. 98, 101
(1895). The duty to file rates with the Commission, see
§10762, and the obligation to charge only those rates, see
§ 10761, have always been considered essential to preventing
price discrimination and stabilizing rates. "In order to render rates definite and certain, and to prevent discrimination
and other abuses, the statute require[s] the filing and publishing of tariffs specifying the rates adopted by the carrier,
and ma[kes] these the legal rates, that is, those which mus:
be charged to all shippers alike." Arizona Grocery Co. v.
Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 284 U. S. 370, 384 (1932).
Given the close interplay between the duties imposed by
§§10761-10762 and the statutory prohibition on discrimination, see §10741, this Court has read the statute to create
strict filed rate requirements and to forbid equitable defenses
to collection of the filed tariff. See Mugg, supra, at 245;
Hefiey, supra, at 101. The classic statement of the "filed
rate doctrine," as it has come to be known, is explained in
Louis-uille & Nashville R. Co. v. Maxwell, 237 U. S. 94
(1915). In that case, the Court held that a passenger who
purchased a train ticket at a rate misquoted by the ticket
agent did not have a defense against the subsequent collection of the higher tariff rate by the railroad.
" 4l Jnder the Interstate Commerce Act, the rate of the
carrier duly filed is the only lawful charge. Deviation
from it is not permitted upon any pretext. Shippers and
travelers are charged with notice of it, and they as well
as the carrier must abide by it, unless it is found by the
Commission to be unreasonable. Ignorance or misquo* Compare In re Caravan Refrigemted Cargo, Inc. (Supreme Beef Processors), 864 F. 2d 388 (CA5 1989), with Delta Tmmc Seivice v. Tmnstop,
F. 2d
(CM 1990); Orscheln Bros. Truck Lines, Inc. v. Zenith
Electronic Corp., 899 F. 2d 642 (CAT 1990); West Coast Truck Lines, Inc.
v. Weyerhaeuser, Co., 893 F. 2d 1016 (CA9 1990); Delta Traffic Service cc
Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. Appco Paper & Plastics Corp., 893 F. 2d
472 (CA2 1990).
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tation of rates is not an excuse for paying or charging
either less or more than the rate filed. This rule is undeniably strict and it obviously may work hardship in
some cases, but it embodies the policy which has been
adopted by Congress in the regulation of interstate commerce in order to prevent unjust discrimination." Id.,
at 97.9
This rigid approach was deemed necessary to prevent carriers from intentionally "misquoting" rates to shippers as a
means of offering them rebates or discounts. See S. Rep.
No. 46, 49th Cong., 1st Sess., 181, 188-190, 198-200 (1886).
As the Commission itself found, "past experience shows that
billing clerks and other agents of carriers might easily become experts in the making of errors and mistakes in the quotation of rates to favored shippers, while other shippers, less
fortunate in their relations with carriers and whose traffic is
less important, would*be compelled to pay the higher published rates." Poor v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 12 I. C. C.
418, 421 Grain Co. (1907); see also Western Transp. Co. v.
Wilson & Co., 682 F. 2d 1227, 1230-1231 (CA7 1982). Despite the harsh effects of the filed rate doctrine, we have consistently adhered to it. See, e. g., Thurston Motor Lines,
Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., 460 U. S. 533, 535 (1983);
Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 456 U. S., at 343-344; Baldtvin v. Scott County Milling Co., 307 U. S. 478, 484-485
(1939); Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Central Iron & Coal
Co., 265 U. S. 59, 65 (1924).
The filed rate doctrine, however, contains an important caveat: the filed rate is not enforceable if the ICC finds the rate
to be unreasonable. See Maxwell, supra, at 97 (filed rate
applies "unless it is found by the Commission to be unreasonable'^ (emphasis added); see also Keogh, 260 U. S., at 163
("The legal rights of shipper as against carrier in respect to a
rate are measured by the published tariff. Unless and until
suspended or set aside, this rate is made, for all purposes, the
legal rate") (emphasis added). The filed rate doctrine,
therefore, follows from the requirement that only filed rates
be collected, as commanded by §§10761 and 10762, the requirement that rates not be discriminatory, see 49 U. S. C.
§10741, and the requirement of §10701 that carriers adopt
reasonable rates and practices. As we explained in Arizona
Grocery, supra, although the filed rate is the legal rate, the
Act
"did not abrogate, but [rather] expressly affirmed, the
common-law duty to charge no more than a reasonable
rate . . . . In other words, the legal rate was not made
by the statute a lawful rate—it was lawful only if it was
reasonable. Under [the Act] the shipper was bound to
pay the legal rate; but if he could show that it was unreasonable he might recover reparation.
"The Act altered the common law by lodging in the
Commission the power theretofore exercised by courts,
of determining the reasonableness of a published rate.
If the finding on this question was against the carrier,
reparation was to be awarded the shipper, and only the
enforcement of the award was relegated to the courts."
284 U. S., at 384-385 (footnote omitted).
•See also Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Central Iron & Coal Co., 265
U. S. 59, 65 (1924) ("No contract of the carrier could reduce the amount
legally payable; or release from liability a shipper who had assumed an obligation to pay the charges. Nor could any act or omission of the carrier
(except the running of the statute of limitations) estop or preclude it from
enforcing payment of the full amount by a person liable therefor"); Kansas
City Southern R. Co. v. Carl, 221 U. S. 639, 653 (1913) ("Neither the intentional nor accidental misstatement of the applicable published rate will
bind the carrier or shipper. The lawful rate is that which the carrier must
exact and that which the shipper must pay. The shipper's knowledge of
the lawful rate is conclusively presumed").
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In the instant case, the Commission did not find that the
rates were unreasonable10 but rather concluded that the carrier had engaged in an unreasonable practice in violation of
§ 10701 that should preclude it from collecting the filed rates.
The Commission argues that under the filed rate doctrine, a
finding that the carrier engaged in an unreasonable practice
should, like a finding that the filed rate is unreasonable,
disentitle the carrier to collection of the filed rate. We have
never held that a carrier's unreasonable practice justifies departure from the filed tariff schedule." But we need not
resolve this issue today because we conclude that the justification for departure from the filed tariff schedule that the
ICC set forth in its Negotiated Rates policy rests on an interpretation of the Act that is contrary to the language and
structure of the statute as a whole and the requirements that
make up the filed rate doctrine in particular.
Under the Negotiated Rates policy, the ICC has determined that a carrier engages in an unreasonable practice
when it attempts to collect the filed rate after the parties
have negotiated a lower rate. The ICC argues that its conclusion is entitled to deference because § 10701 does not specifically address the types of practices that are to be considered unreasonable and because its construction is rational
and consistent with the statute. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837,
843 (1984).
We disagree. For a century, this Court has held that the
Act, as it incorporates the filed rate doctrine, forbids as
discriminatory the secret negotiation and collection of rates
lower than the filed rate. See supra, at
. By refusing
to order collection of the filed rate solely because the parties
had agreed to a lower rate, the ICC has permitted the very
price discrimination the Act by its terms seeks to prevent.
See 49 U. S. C. § 10741. As we stated in Armour Packing
Co. v. United States, 209 U. S. 56, 81 (1908):
"If the rates are subject to secret alteration by special
agreement then the statute will fail of its purpose to establish a rate duly published, known to all, and from
which neither shipper nor carrier may depart. . . . [The
Act] has provided for the establishing of one rate, to be
filed as provided, subject to change as provided, and that
rate to be while in force the only legal rate. Any other
construction of the statute opens the door to the possibility of the very abuses of unequal rates which it was the
design of the statute to prohibit and punish."
Congress has not diverged from this interpretation and we
10
The ICC did not determine whether the tariff rates were unreasonable
even though respondent requested such a determination. We therefore
must assume, for purposes of our decision today, tha: the rates were reasonable. The issue of the reasonableness of the tariff rates is open for
exploration on remand.
" None of our cases involving a determination by the ICC that the carrier engaged in an unreasonable practices has required departure from the
filed tariff schedule altogether, instead, they have required merelv ihe
application of a different filed tariff. For example, in Hewitt-Robins Inc.
v. Eastern Freight-ways, Inc., 371 U. S. 84, 86 (1962;, the Commission's
finding that a carrier had engaged in an unreasonable practice by routing
intrastate shipments over interstate routes required orJy the application of
a different filed rate, i. e., the intrastate rates, rather than departure from
the tariff schedule entirely. See also Adams v. MilU, 286 U. S. 397, 412
(1932) (reparations ordered constituted difference between one filed rate
and another). Likewise, the cases in which the ICC has determined that a
carrier engaged in an unreasonable practice by requiring a certain notation
attached to the bill of lading to qualify the shipper for a reduced tariff also
did not require deviation from the filed tariff. See Standard Brands, Inc.
v. Central R. Co. of New Jersey, 350 I. C. C. 555 (1974); Carriers Traffic
Service, Inc. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 881 F. 26 475, 481-4S2 (CA7
1989) (collecting cases).
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dechne to revisit it ourselves. See California v. FERC, 495
U. S.
,
(1990), slip op. at 6 (recognizing the respect
"this Court must accord to long-standing and well-entrenched
decisions, especially those interpreting stautes that underlie
complex regulatory regimes"). Once we have determined a
statute's clear meaning, we adhere to that determination
under the doctrine of stare decisis, and we judge an agency's
later interpretation of the statute against our prior determination of the statute's meaning. Labelling the carrier's
conduct an "unreasonable practice" cannot disguise the fact
that the ICC is justifying deviation from the filed rate purely
on the ground that the carrier and shipper have privately negotiated a lower rate. Stripped of its semantic cover, the
Negotiated Rates policy and, more specifically, the Commission's interpretation of "unreasonable practices" thus stand
revealed as flatly inconsistent with the statutory scheme as a
whole, cf. Fort Stewart Softools v. FLRA, 495 U. S.
,
(1990) slip op., at 3; Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494
U. S.
,
(1990) [slip op., at 8], and §§ 10761 and 10762
in particular.
Nor can the Negotiated Rates policy be justified as a remedy for the carrier's failure to comply with § 10762's directive
to file the negotiated rate with the ICC. See Negotiated
Rates I, 3 I. C. C. 2d, at 103. The Commission argues that
the carrier should not receive a windfall, i. e., the higher filed
rate, from its failure to comply with the statute. See Brief
for United States 25-27. But § 10761 requires the carrier to
collect the filed rate, and we have never accepted the argument that such "equities" are relevant to the application of
§10761." See, e. g.9 Maxwell, 237 U. S., at 97. Indeed,
strict adherence to the filed rate has never been justified on
the ground that the carrier is equitably entitled to that rate,
but rather that such adherence, despite its harsh consequences in some cases, is necessary to enforcement of the
Act. See supra, at
.
Compliance with §§ 10761 and 10762 is "utterly central" to
the administration of the Act. Regular Common Carrier
Conference v. United States, 253 U. S. App. D. D. 305, 308,
793 F. 2d 376, 379 (1986). "Without [these provisions] . . .
it would be monumentally difficult to enforce the requirement
that rates be reasonable and nondiscriminatory, . . . and virtually impossible for the public to assert its right to challenge
the lawfulness of existing proposed rates." Ibid, (citations
omitted). Although the ICC argues that the Negotiated
Rates policy does not "abolis[h] the requirement in section
10761 that carriers must continue to charge the tariff rate,"
App. to Pet. for Cert. 36a, the policy, by sanctioning adherence to unfiled rates, undermines the basic structure of the
Act. The ICC cannot review in advance the reasonableness
u
Even if the equities of the situation were relevant, it is difficult to see
how the equities favor the shipper. One would think that a shipper who
has the market power to require a carrier to reduce his tariffs could also
require proof from a carrier that th£ negotiated rates had been filed before
tendering the shipment, especially since there are commercial services providing up-to-the-minute details of the carrier's rate schedule. But see
Fort Howard Papa- Co. v. Maislin Industries, U. S., Inc., No. MC-C10983, slip op., at 5 (Aug. 4, 1987) (unreasonable practice found even when
the shipper had a copy of the tariff). Nevertheless, the Commission
argues that if § 10761 "prevailed over the requirement of reasonable practices, a carrier could intentionally engage in 'bait and switch' tactics by
negotiating one rate, fraudulently representing that it was properly filed,
and then insisting upon collection of a higher tariff rate." Brief for United
States 30. We note first that the Commission determined that there was
no intentional or fraudulent conduct in this case. Moreover, any carrier
who engaged in such conduct could be punished under 49 U. S. C.
§ 11903(b) (1982 ed.). Finally, this risk of intentional misconduct on the
part of a carrier has always existed and has never been considered sufficient to justify a less stringent interpretation of § 10761.
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of unfiled rates. Likewise, other shippers cannot know if
they should challenge a carrier's rates as discriminatory
when many of the carrier's rates are privately negotiated and
never disclosed to the ICC. Thus, although we agree that
the Commission may have discretion to craft appropriate
remedies for violations of the statute, see ICC v. American
Trucking Assns., Inc. 467 U. S. 354, 364-365 (1984), the
"remedy" articulated in the Negotiated Rates policy effectively renders nugatory the requirements of §§10761 and
10762 and conflicts directly with the core purposes of the Act.
The ICC maintains, however, that the passage of the
Motor Carrier Act of 1980 (MCA), Pub. L. 96-296, 94 Stat.
793, justifies its Negotiated Rates policy. The MCA substantially deregulated the motor carrier industry in many
ways in an effort to "promote competitive and efficient transportation services." Pub. L. 96-296, §4, formerly codified
at 49 U. S : C. § 10101(a)(7) (1976 ed., Supp. V). In addition
to loosening entry controls, see §5, codified at 49 U. S. C.
§10922 (1982 ed.), the MCA also created a zone of reasonableness within which carriers can raise rates without interference from the ICC. See § 11, codified at 49 U. S. C.
§10708 (1982 ed.). More importantly, the MCA also allows
motor carriers to operate as both common carriers and contract carriers. See Pub. L. 96-296, § 10(b)(1), amending 49
U. S. C. § 10930(a) (1982 ed.). A contract carrier transports
property under exclusive agreements with a shipper, see 49
U. S. C. §10102(14) (1982 ed.), and the Commission has exempted all motor contract carriers from the requirements of
§§ 10761 and 10762. See Exemption of Motor Contract Carriers from Tariff Filing Requirements, 133 M. C. C. 150
(1983), aff'd sub nom. Central & Southern Motor Freight
Tariff Assn., Inc. v. United States, 244 U. S. App. D. C.
226, 757 F. 2d 301, cert, denied, 474 U. S. 1019 (1985).13 The
Commission has also relaxed the regulations relating to
motor common carriers, most significantly, by allowing decreased rates to go into effect one day after the filing of a
tariff. See Slwrt Notice Effectiveness for Independently
Filed Rates, 11. C. C. 2d 146 (1984), aff'd sub nom. Southern
Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 773 F. 2d
1561 (CAll 1985).M In Negotiated Rates I and //, the
Commission concluded that in light of the more competitive
environment, strict adherence to the filed rate doctrine "is inappropriate and unnecessary to deter discrimination today."
Negotiated Rates I, 3 I. C. C , at 106. According to the
Commission, " t h e inability of a shipper to rely on a carrier's
"The Act specifically provides that the Commission may "grant relief*' from the filing requirements to motor contract carriers "when relief
is consistent with the public interest and the transportation policy."
§§ 10761(b), 10762(f); see also § 10702(b). The Commission concluded that
granting a class-wide exemption rather than individual exemptions was
both in the public interest and consistent with the purpose behind the Act:
See Exemption of Motor Contmct Carriers fivm Tariff Filing Requirements 133 M. C. C , 150, 156-158 (1983). The Commission has also
allowed contract carriers to obtain permits to serve entire classes of
unnamed shippers. See Issuance of Permits Authorizing Industrywide
Service, 133 M. C. C. 298 (1983).
" The Act provides that rates will not go into effect until 30 days after
the filing of a tariff, see § 10762(c)(3), but specifically allows the Commission to reduce the period if "cause exists." § 10762(d). The Commission
determined that cause existed to reduce the waiting period to one day after
thefilingof a tariff reducing rates and seven days after thefilingof a tariff
increasing rates. See Short Notice Effectiveness for Independently Filed
Rates, 1 T C. C. 2d, 146, 150-160 (1982). In addition, the Commission has
determined that neither tariffs applicable to a single shipper nor rates providing volume discounts are per se discriminator}'- See Rates for a
Named Shipper or Receiver, 367 I. C. C. 2d 959 (19S4); Petition for Declaratory Order—Lawfulness of Volume Discount Rates by Motor Common Carriers of Propeity, 365 I. C. C. 711 (1982). We express no view
today on the validity of such policies.
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interpretation of a tariff is a greater evil than the remote possibility that a carrier might intentionally misquote an applicable tariff rate to discriminate illegally between shippers.'"
Ibid., quoting Seaboard System R. Co. v. United States, 794
F. 2d 635, 638 (CAll 1986).
We reject this argument. Although the Commission has
both the authority and expertise generally to adopt new policies when faced with new developments in the industry, see
American Trucking Assns, Inc. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R.
Co., 387 U. S. 397, 416 (1967), it does not have the power
to adopt a policy that directly conflicts with its governing
statute. Nothing in the MCA repeals §§ 10761 and 10762 or
casts doubt on our prior interpretation of those sections.
Generalized congressional exhortations to "increase competition" cannot provide the ICC authority to alter the wellestablished statutory filed rate requirements. As we said in
Square D Co. v. Niagara^rontier Traffic Bureau, Inc., with
respect to a similarly longstanding judicial interpretation of
the Act:
"Congress must be presumed to have been fully cognizant of this interpretation of the statutory scheme, which
had been a significant part of our settled law for over half
a century, and . . . Congress did not see fit to change it
when Congress carefully reexamined this area of the law
in 1980. [Respondent has] pointed to no specific statutory provision or legislative history indicating a specific
congressional intention to overturn the longstanding . . .
construction; harmony with the general legislative purpose is inadequate for that formidable task." 476 U. S.,
at 420 (footnotes omitted).
See also California v. FERC, 495 U. S., at
, slip op., at
6-7. Even before the passage of the MCA, Congress had
allowed the Commission to exempt motor contract carriers
from the requirement that they adhere to the published tariff, see 49 U. S. C. § 10761(b) (1982 ed.), demonstrating that
Congress is aware of the requirement and has deliberately
chosen not to disturb it with respect to motor common carriers.15 If strict adherence to §§ 10761 and 10762 as embodied
in the filed rate doctrine has become an anachronism in the
wake of the MCA, it is the responsibility of Congress to modify or eliminate these sections.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring.

I join the Court's opinion but add a few words in response
to JUSTICE STEVENS' assertion that the Court has "fail[ed] to

adhere today to the teaching of Chevron [U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837
(1984)]." Post, at 14.'
In my view, the Court correctly relies upon our -p:-r>r
"filed-rate" decisions, which were based not on the "regulatory scheme as a whole," post, at 6—by which JUSTICE STEVENS appears to mean the regulatory climate within which
" Moreover, in the Household Goods Transportation Act of 1980, Pub.
L. 96-454, 94 Stat. 2011, Congress provided that "motor common carrier[s]
providing transportation of household goods . . . may, subject to the provisions of this chapter (including the general tariff requirements of section
10762 of this title), establish a rate for the transportation of household
goods which is based on the carrier's written, binding estimate of charges
for providing such transportation." 49 U. S. C § 10735(a)(1) ((1982 ed.,
Supp. V) (emphasis added). This exception for household goods carriers
also demonstrates that Congress is aware of, but has elected not to eliminate as applied to other motor common carriers, the general requirements
of §§ 10761 and 10762.
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the statute then operated, post, at 7-9—but rather on the
text of the statute. JUSTICE STEVENS argues that there is
no textual limitation on the scope of the term "reasonable," as
that term is used in 49 U. S. C. § 10701(a) (1982 ed.) ("A . . .
practice related to transportation or service by a carrier . . .
must be reasonable"), and that we must therefore accord deference to the Commission's interpretation of that term.
Post, at 4, 13-14. I do not agree. Whatever else may'qualify as an unreasonable practice, under no sensible construction of that term could it consist of failing to do what the statute explicitly prohibits doing—viz., charging or receiving a
rate different from the rate specified in a tariff. 49 U. S. C.
§ 10761(a) (1982 ed.).
Nor can the phrase "[e]xcept as provided in this subtitle,"
§ 10761(a) carry the enormous weight that JUSTICE STEVENS
places upon it. Post, at 5, and n. 6. That clause is affixed
to only* the first sentence of § 10761(a), which states that before providing transportation and senices, certain carriers
must place their rates on file. (What is referred to by the
exception is obvious—such provisions as 49 U. S. C. § 10762
(a)(1) (1982 ed.), which states that certain motor contract carriers that serve only one shipper need file only minimum
rates.) But it is the second sentence of § 10761(a) that contains the requirement that only filed rates can be charged.
Of course the subject of the second sentence, "ftjhat earner"
(emphasis added), must reasonably be deemed to refer to a
carrier covered by the first sentence—so that the obligation
to charge the filed rate applies only to those carriers required
to file "the rate for the transportation or service." (Thus, a
motor contract carrier required to file only minimum rates
under § 10762(a)(1) can charge rates higher than those minimums.) But there is no way in which the "[e]xcept as provided" clause can be imported directly into the second sentence, causing it to recite an exception to the obligation to
charge the required-to-be-filed rate, which JUSTICE S T E -

VENS asserts can refer to the "reasonable practices" requirement of § 10701(a) as readily as it can to the "reasonable rate"
requirement. Post, at 4. The basis for the "unreasonable
rate" exception to the "filed rate" rule is not the "[ejxeept as
provided" language at all; rather it is the need to reconcile
two textual provisions that would otherwise be categorically
inconsistent (do not charge unreasonable rates, but charge
whatever rates you have filed). While an "unreasonable
rate" unavoidably means a rate that is economically unreasonable—so that where economic unreasonableness exists
§§ 10701(a) and 10761(a) need to be reconciled by assuming an
implicit but unexpressed exception to the filed-rate requirement—an "unreasonable practice" does not unavoidably
mean charging the filed rate when a different rate has been
promised, so with respect to that term normal construction
of § 10701(a) (as in the previous paragraph) avoids any
difficulty.
Finally, JUSTICE STEVENS points to changes in the motor

carrier industry occasioned in part by 1980 amendments to
the statute, which amendments he says "represented a fundamental policy choice in favor of deregulation." Post, at 9.
See also post, at 9-13. But the only amendments of any relevance to the requirement of § 10761(a) that a carrier collect
no rate other than the filed rate are those that remove certain
pre-existing barriers to motor contract carriage, see generally Central & Southern Motor Freight Tariff Association,
Inc. v. United States, 244 U. S. App. D. C. 226, 757 F. 2d
301, 311-312 (1985) (per curiam)—which amendments have
the practical effect of making more carriers eligible for the
pre-existing exception to the filing requirement of § 10761(a),
permitting the Commission to exempt them under certain cir-
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cumstances. 49 U. S. C. § 10761(b) (1982 ed.). While this
plainly reflects an intent to deregulate, it reflects an intent to
deregulate within the framework of the existing statutory
scheme. Perhaps deregulation cannot efficiently be accomplished within that framework, but that is Congress' choice
and not the Commission's or ours. It may well be, as JUSTICE STEVENS thinks, that after the 1980 amendments and
the various administrative changes that the Commission has
made by rule, "'[t]he skeleton of regulation remains; the flesh
has been stripped away.'" Post, at 10, quoting Orscheln
Bros. Truck Lines, Inc. v. Zenith Electric Corp., 899 F. 2d
642, 644-645 (CA7 1990). But it is the skeleton we are construing, and we must read it for what it says.
JUSTICE STEVENS, with^hom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins,
dissenting.
?
The "filed rate doctrine" was developed in the 19th century
as part of a program to regulate the ruthless exercise of monopoly power by the nation's railroads. Today the Court
places an interpretation on that doctrine even more strict
than the original version. In doing so, the Court misreads
the text of the Interstate Commerce Act (Act), 49 U. S. C.
§ 10101 et seq. (1982 ed.), ignores the history of motor carrier
regulation in this country, and gives no deference to the sensible construction of the Act by six Courts of Appeals l and
the administrative agency responsible for its enforcement.
Most significantly, the majority fails to appreciate the significance of the "sea change" in the statutory scheme that has
converted a regime of regulated monopoly pricing into a
highly competitive market. Even wearing his famous blinders, old Dobbin would see through the tired arguments the
Court accepts today.
I
As originally enacted in 1887, the Act provided, in part:
"And when any such common carrier shall have established and published its rates, fares, and charges in
compliance with the provisions of this section, it shall be
unlawful for such common carrier to charge, demand,
collect, or receive from any person or persons a greater
or less compensation for the transportation of passengers or property, or for any services in connection therewith, than is specified in such published schedule of
rates, fares, and charges as may at the time be in force."
24 Stat. 381.

Read literally, this text commanded strict adherence to the
tariffs filed by a carrier. From the beginning, however, the
Court construed that command as subject to the unstated exception that a filed rate would not be enforced if the Interstate Commerce Commission (Commission) determined that
the rates were "unreasonable."2 Amendments to the Act
incorporated language that expressly allows exceptions in
1
See Delta Traffic Service, Inc. v. Transtop* Inc.,
F. 2d
(CA1
1990); Orpcheln Bros. Truck Lines, Inc. v. Zenith Electric Corp., 899 F. 2d
642 (CA7 1990); Maislin v. Primary Steel, Inc., 879 F. 2d 400 (CA8 1989)
(case below); West Coast Truck Lines, Inc. v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 893 F. 2d
1016 (CA9 1990); Seaboard System R. Co. v. United States, 794 F. 2d 635
(CA11 1986). The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Seaboard System involved railroad regulation rather than motor
carrier regulation, but presented very similar issues.
The sole exception to this consensus is hi re Caravan Refrigerated
Cargo, Inc., 864 F. 2d 388 (CA5 1989).
'Thus, in the most frequently quoted statement of the filed rate doctrine, we wrote:
"Under the Interstate Commerce Act, the rate of the carrier duly filed is
the only lawful charge. Deviation from it is not permitted upon any pretext. Shippers and travelers are charged with notice of it, and they as
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cases in which the Commission determines that strict enforcement would be unreasonable.*
Thus, 49 U. S. C. § 10761(a) (1982 ed.) now provides:
"Except as provided in this subtitle, a carrier providing
transportation or service subject to the jurisdiction of
the Interstate Commerce Commission under chapter 105
of this title shall provide that transportation or service
only if the rate for the transportation or service is contained in a tariff that is in effect under this subchapter.
That carrier may not charge or receive a different compensation for that transportation or service than the rate
specified in the tariff whether by returning a part of that
rate to a person, giving a person a privilege, allowing the
use of a facility that affects the value of that transportation or service, or another device." (Emphasis added).
The emphasized language in the foregoing provision obviously refers, inter alia, to 49 U. S. C. § 10701(a) which
states, in part:
"A rate (other than a rail rate), classification, rule, or
practice related to transportation or service provided by
a carrier subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate
Commerce Commission under chapter 105 of this title
must be reasonable." (Emphasis added).
Furthermore, 49 U. S. C. § 10704(b) (1982 ed.) expressly authorizes the Commission, after finding that a rate or practice
of a carrier is unreasonable, to prescribe the rate or practice
that the carrier must follow.4
The action of the Commission in this case faithfully tracks
its statutory grant of authority. After considering all of the
relevant evidence, the Commission determined "that it would
be an unreasonable practice now to require Primary to pay
undercharges for the difference between the negotiated rates
and the tariff rates." App. to Pet for Cert. 44a. That
determination was unquestionably consistent with the plain
language of the statute governing the Commission's authority. A carrier's failure to file negotiated rates obviously
does not make it reasonable for the carrier to quote low rates
and collect higher ones; the Commission is free to find, as it
has done, that a practice of misquotation, failure to file, and
subsequent collection is unreasonable under § 10701(a).
The Court offers no reason whatsoever to doubt this conclusion. Indeed, the Court's discussion of the statutory text
consists almost entirely of vague references to some unarticulated interplay between §§ 10761(a) and 10762(a)(1),6 see
well as the carrier must abide by it, unless it is found by the Commission
to be unreasonable." (Emphasis added). Louisville & Nashville R. Co.
v. Maxwell, 237 U. S. 94, 97 (1915).
Similarly, in Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co., 260 U. S. 156, 163
(1922), we wrote:
"The legal rights of shipper as against carrier in respect to a raie are measured by the published tariff. Unless and until suspended or set aside, this
rate is made, for all purposes, the legal rate, as between carrier and shipper." (Emphasis added).
• See, e. g., 34 Stat. 587.
4
49 U. S. C. § lO704(bXD (1982 ed. and Supp. V) provides in part:
"When the Commission decides that a rate charged or collected by—
"(A) a motor common carrier for providing transportation subject to its
jurisdiction under subchapter II of chapter 105 of this title by itself, with
another motor common carrier, with a rail, express, or water common carrier, or any of them;
"or that a classification, rule, or practice of that carrier, does or will violate
this chapter, the Commission shall prescribe the rate (including a maximum or minimum rate, or both), classification, rule, or practice to be
followed."
•49 U. S. C. § 10762(a)(1) (1982 ed.) provides:
"A motor common carrier shall publish and file with the Commission tariffs
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ante, at 9, an interplay which the Court contends would be
"renderfed] nugatory" if carriers are not permitted to obtain
payment of the filed rate when they have led shippers to rely
upon a lower negotiated rate. Ante, at 15. For the reasons
I have already stated, the text of those provisions does not
generate any "interplay" capable of sustaining so rigid an inference. The Court virtually concedes as much, for it recognizes that the unreasonableness of a rate is a longstanding
ground for denying collection of the filed rate, ante, at 11,
and n. 10, and refuses to hold that the unreasonableness of a
practice can never bar collection of a filed rate, ante, at 12.
Having admitted that the doctrine synthesized from the
"interplay" between §§ 10761(a) and 10762(a)(1) is susceptible
of exceptions based upon the nature of a carrier's rates and
practices, the Court can argue only that this particular exception is impermissible.* The source of the exceptions is,
however, not the "interjSay" that dominates the majority's
reasoning, but the combined effect of the "Except as otherwise provided" language of § 10761(a) and the express authority to determine reasonableness granted to the Commission
by § 10701(a). This second "interplay" gets little attention
from the majority, and it is difficult to see how the text of
either component might yield the distinction which the majority insists upon drawing. Nor can the Court mean that
the exception literally voids the obligations imposed by
§§ 10761(a) and 10762(a)(1) because the Commission maintains, and the Court does not deny, that the filed rate doctrine would still provide an effective right to recover for undercharges in some cases. See, e. g., NITL-Petition to
Institute Rulemaking on Negotiated Motor Common Carrier
Rates, 5 I. C. C. 2d 623, 629, and n. 13 (1989). Moreover,
even if the "filed rate doctrine" were discarded entirely, a

containing the rates for transportation it may provide under this subtitle.
The Commission may prescribe other information that motor common carriers shall include in their tariffs."
* The Court attempts to make hay of the fact that under § 10761(a) carriers "may not charge or receive a different compensation for that transportation or service than the rate specified in the tariff." According to the
Court, this provision "requires the carrier to collect the filed rate." Ante,
at 14. That is true if the Court means that the carrier is obligated to seek
payment of the filed rate, but not if the Court means that the carrier is
entitled to receive payment of the filed rate. The longstanding reasonableness exception to the filed rate doctrine—an exception no: contested
by the Court—makes this much clear. Moreover, as has already been
noted, the clause that prefaces § 10761(a) allows for the existence of exceptions to the collection requirement. The Court's argument simply begs
the question before us, which is under what conditions a valid defense to a
carrier's suit may exist.
Even less persuasive than the Court's argument from the collection requirement is a related claim made by petitioners. They contend that because carriers are legally obligated to collect the filed rate, the practice of
filing suit to collect that rate cannot be unreasonable. See, e. g., Reply
Brief for Petitioners 7-8. This argument, too, ignores the exceptions
clause at the beginning of § 10761(a). Moreover, the argument
mischaracterizes the practice deemM unreasonable by the Commission: a
collection suit is one component of that practice, even though the suit considered in isolation from the broader course of conduct is not itself unreasonable. See NITL-Petition to Institute > Rulemaking on Negotiated
Motor Common Carrier Rates, 51. C. C. 2d 623, 628, n. 11 (1989); see also
ante, at 4-5.
JUSTICE SCALIA trots out the same argument again, this time harnessed
to an assertion that the exceptions clause applies only to the first sentence
of § 10761(a). Ante, at 2 (concurring opinion). Although that is perhaps a
possible reading of § 10761(a), it is obviously not the only one. There is no
reason to believe that it is an interpretation of the section that the Commission must accept. In any event, JUSTICE SCALIA admits that § 10701(a)—
which imposes a reasonableness condition upon practices and rates alike—
modifies the requirements of § 10761(a), and this admission renders moot
his discussion of the exceptions clause. Ante, at 2-3 (concurring opinion).
In light of that admission, JUSTICE SCALIA'S argument fails for exactly the
reasons set out above.
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knowing or willful failure to comply with §§ 10761(a) and
10762(a)(1) may subject a carrier to prosecution.7
The Court's assertion that the agency policy now before us
'Venders nugatory" the "interplay" between §§ 10761(a) and
10762(a)(1) therefore amounts to no more than an observation
that the policy substantially diminishes the importance of the
'Tiled rate doctrine" as a means for enforcing those sections.
Consideration of the statute's structure makes all the more
clear what should already be evident from the statutory text:
the Court's observation is true but utterly irrelevant.
II
Because no particular provision of the statute supports the
Court's position, its principal argument must be that the
agency's construction of the Act is inconsistent with the regulatory scheme as a whole. See ante, at 13. There are, of
course,' important differences between markets in which,
prices are regulated, either by private cartels or by public authority, and those in which prices are the product of independent decisions by competitors. Rules requiring adherence to predetermined prices are characteristic of regulated
markets, but are incompatible with independent pricing in a
competitive market.8 The "filed rate doctrine" has played
an important role, not just in the segments of the transportation industry regulated by the Interstate Commerce Commission, but in other regulated markets as well.6 It requires the courts to respect the public agency's control over
market prices and industry practices; moreover, it significantly reduces the temptation of regulated parties to deviate
from the market-wide rules formulated by the agency.
The filed rate doctrine has been a part of our law during
the century of regulation of the railroad industry by the Commission. In 1935, when Congress decided to impose economic regulation on the motor carrier industry, partly if not
primarily in order to protect the railroads from too much
competition,10 the filed rate doctrine was applied to their
7

See, e. p., 49 U. S. C. §§ 11903 and 11904 (1982 ed.).
•See, e. g., Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U. S. 553,
582-583 (1936) (regulation by private agreement in violation of the Sherman Act); California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc., 445 U. S. 97, 99 (1980) (state regulation of wine prices); United Gas
Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., 350 U. S. 332, 338 (1D56) (federal regulation of natural gas prices).
'See, e. g., Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public
Service Co., 341 U. S. 246, 251-252 (1951) (federal regulation of prices for
electrical power); Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U. S. 571,
577-578 (1981) (federal regulation of prices for natural gas); H. J. Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U. S.
,
, n. 1 (19S9) (state
regulation of rates for telephone service).
10
"Though identical statutory standards govern both motor carrier and
rail consolidations, their legislative backgrounds differ. The demand for
motor carrier regulation came, not from shippers, as in railroads, but from
the roads themselves, who urged that virtually unregulated motor carrier
competition threatened railroad financial stability. This view wTas also
supported by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the Federal Coordinator of Transportation who, in his 1934 and 1935 reports, recommended legislation regulating interstate motor carriers. In addition, during hearings on proposed legislation, many truck operators, previously
opposed to Federal regulation, favored such control because they feared
the effects of unrestrained competition on the motor carrier industry itself.
The result was legislation, enacted in 1935, which from the first placed considerable restraint on motor carrier competition.
"Entry was controlled by certificates of convenience and necessity; those
already in the field were given a preferred position by the grandfather
clauses, assuring not only the right to continue in operation, but also to expand within the areas or between the points which they already served.
Moreover, the Commission was empowered to establish niinimum as wTell
as maximum rates. And this minimum rate power was soon utilized by
the Commission both to protect the railroads from motor carrier competition as well as to safeguard the motor carrier industry from 'destructive'
competition within its own ranks. Indeed, from the inception of motor
carrier regulation to the present day, the power to fix minimum rates has
been more significant than the authority to fix maximum charges." Re-
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rates just as it had previously applied to the railroads. It
had the same regulatory purpose.11 In its applications during the period of regulatory control over motor carrier ratemaking, the doctrine was for the most part applied to reinforce the policies and the decisions of the regulatory agency.12
After years of debate over whether it was sound policy to
substitute regulation for competition in the motor carrier industry, Congress decided to eliminate the regulatory barriers to free entry and individual ratemaking. The 1980
amendments to the Act represented a fundamental policy
choice in favor of deregulation." Overnight the application
of the filed rate doctrine in that market became an anachronism. As Judge Posner has explained:
"Many years later came deregulation, which has
changed the trucking industry beyond recognition. As
a result of amendments made to the Motor Carrier Act in
port of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws 265 (1956).
u
T o understand the purpose of the filed-rate doctrine and hence the
Commission's recent efforts to relax it, on which see National Industrial
Transportation League—Petition to Institute Rulemaking on Negotiated
Motor Common Carrier Rates, 3 I. C. C. 2d 99 (19S6); Buckeye Cellulose
Corp. v. Louisville & Nashville R. R.,1I. C. C. 2d 767 (1985), affirmed as
Seaboard System R. R. v. United States, supra; Petition to Institute
Rulemaking on Negotiated Motor Common Carrier Rates, 5 I. C. C. 2d
623 (1989), one must understand the history of federal regulation of common carriers. Railroads have heavy fixed costs, and in their heyday faced
Utile effective competition from other modes of transportation. Naturally
they tended to load the fixed costs onto those shippers who had poor competitive alternatives and to charge low prices to those shippers who had
good alternatives by reason of (for example) being big enough to induce
two or more railroads to serve their plants. This created a disparity in
transportation costs painful to shippers who paid high railroad rates and
were competing with shippers who paid low rates, and it also undermined
the railroads' efforts to cartelize railroad transportation. The confluence
of interests between railroads and weak shippers resulted in a regulatory
scheme in which railroads were forbidden both to price off tariff and to
refuse service to any shipper at the tariffed rate. Western Transportation
Co. v. Wilson & Co., supra, 682 F. 2d at 1230-31. The scheme would
have been undermined if carriers had been permitted to negotiate secret
discounts with favored shippers. Regular Common Carrier Conference v.
United States, 793 F. 2d 376, 379 (D. C. Cir. 1986). To deter this was the
office of the filed-rate doctrine. It authorized carriers to recover the discounts regardless, which meant that the shipper could not count on being
able to keep any discount that the railroad might dangle before it. Motor
carriers do not have heavy fixed costs, but they do no* like competition any
more than railroads do, so when in 1935 they were brought under federal
regulation (in major part to protect the railroads from their competition)
they were placed under the filed-rate doctrine too." Orscheln Bros. Truck
Lines, Inc. v. Zenith Electric Corp., 899 F. 2d 642, 643-644 (CA7 1990).
u
As the Court's opinion makes clear, there was no tension between judicial interpretation and agency policy in the cases that developed the filed
rate doctrine. See ante, at 10, citing Poor v. Chicago, B. <£ Q. R. Co., 12
I. C. C. 418, 421-422 (1907). On the contrary, a recurring theme in those
cases is that the Commission, rather than the courts, should have primary
responsibility for administration of the statute. The filed rate doctrine
was regarded in significant part as a means for ensuring that this allocation
of responsibility was respected. See, e. g., Texas <£ Pacific R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 440-442 (1907); Arizona Grocery Co. v.
Atchison, T., & S. F. R. Co., 284 U. S. 370, 384-3S5 (1932); Baldwin v.
Scott County Milling Co., 307 U. S. 478, 483-485 (1939). The most notable exception to this pattern is the 6-to-4 decision in T.I.M.E. Inc. v.
United States, 359 U. S. 464 (1959), in which this Court prohibited district
courts from staving collection proceedings pending agency review of the
reasonableness of a filed rate. Although T.I.M.E. is strikingly similar to
today's decision in a host of respects, the majority does not rely upon it.
Its reluctance to place any substantial weight upon T.I.M.E. is easily understood, because that precedent was greatly limited by this Court's subsequent decision in Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freight-ways, Inc., 371
U. S. 84, 88-89 (1962), and what remained of it was soon thereafter unambiguously repudiated by Congress. See Act of Sept. 6, 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-170, §§6-7, 79 Stat. 651-652 (codified at 49 U. S. C. § 11705(b)(3)
(1982 ed. and Supp. V), 49 U. S. C. § 11706(c)(2) (1952 ed.)).
u

Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793.
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1980 and their interpretation by the Commission, the
present regime is essentially one of free competition.
No longer does the ICC seek to nurture and protect cartel pricing and division of markets. A motor carrier
that wants to lower its price can file a new tariff effective
the following day. Short Notice Effectiveness for Independently Filed Motor Carrier and Freight Forwarder
Rates, 1 I. C. C. 2d 146 (1984), affirmed as Southern
Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 773 F.
2d 1561 (11th Cir. 1985). No longer does the Commission seek to limit the number of motor carriers, which
has more than doubled in less than a decade. Most important, a carrier and shipper who want to get out from
under tariff regulation altogether have only to negotiate
a contract of carriage, and then the lawful price is the
price in the contract rather than in any filed tariff.
There used to be all sorts of restrictions on contract carriage, which greatly limited it as an escape hatch from
regulation. There are no longer. Wheaton Van Lines,
Inc. v. ICC, 731 F. 2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1984). The skeleton of regulation remains; the flesh has been stripped
away." Orscheln Bros. Truck Lines, Inc. v. Zenith
Electric Corp., 899 F. 2d 642, 644-645 (CA7 1990).
The significance of these fundamental changes was also
noted and explained by Judge Alarcon:
"A variety of practices that previously would have been
considered discriminatory are now allowed. For example, the ICC has recently ruled that volume discount
rates are not per se unlawfiil and may be justified by cost
savings to the carrier. See Lawfulness of Volume Discount Rates by Motor Common Carrier of Property, 365
I. C. C. 711,715-16 (1982). Moreover, carriers may impose geographic or product line restrictions that must be
met to obtain rate reductions. See Rates for Named
Shipper or Receiver, 367 I. C. C. 959, 962-965 (1984).
"In addition to increased competitive pressures, statutory changes, and a relaxed regulatory climate, the
ICC's Negotiated Rates decisions are a practical response to the information costs faced by shippers. The
ease of filing tariffs and the sheer number filed no longer
makes it appropriate to allocate the burden of discovering a filed rate to the shipper in all cases. Reduced
tariff rates may now be filed to become effective on one
day's notice." West Coast Truck Lines, Inc. v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 893 F. 2d 1016, 1026 (CA9 1990).
The Court catalogues these reforms, ante, at 15-16, but
fails to analyze their implications for the "reasonableness" requirement of § 10701(a) and, consequently, for the provisions
of § 10761(a). What the Court now misses has been succinctly set forth by Judge Alarcon:
"The ICC's determination that the collection of undercharges constitutes an unreasonable practice if the shipper is unaware of the filed rate is also a reflection of
changing legislative goals. Congress modified national
transportation policy when it amended 49 U. S. C.
§ 10101(a) in the Motor Carrier Act of 1980. Section
10101(a)(2) now directs the Commission, in regulating
transportation by motor carrier, to promote competitive
and efficient transportation services in order to (A) meet
the needs of shippers, receivers, passengers, and consumers; [and] (B) allow a variety of quality and price options to meet changing market demands and the diverse
requirements of the shipping and traveling public . . . '
49 U. S. C. § 10101(a)(1)(A), (B) (1982). In addition,
§ 10101(a)(1)(D) directs the ICC to encourage the establishment of reasonable transportation rates without *un-
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fair or destructive competitive practices.' 49 U. S. C
§ 10101(a)(1)(D) (1982). Congress intended these sections of the Motor Carrier Act t o emphasize the importance of competition and efficiency as the most desirable
means for achieving transportation goals while, at the
same time, providing the Commission with sufficient
flexibility to promote the public interest.' H. R. Rep.
No. 96-1069, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1980
U. S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2283, 2294.
"Section 10701(a) provides the ICC with the mechanism to put into effect Congress* restated goals of national transportation policy. By declaring the adherence to filed rates unreasonable under the circumstances
presented in this case, the ICC has demonstrated its intention to prevent carriers from engaging in unfair competitive practices." 893 F. 2d, at 1026-1027.
Despite the Court's p u l l i n g suggestion that the filed rate
doctrine is essential to the "core purposes of the Act," ante,
at 15, the doctrine is instead, as the Court elsewhere seems
to concede, "an anachronism in the wake of the [Motor Carrier Act of 1980]," ante, at 18. If plain text is a poor basis for
the Court's holding, statutory purpose is altogether worse.
As Judge Posner has explained:
"Counsel for the carrier in this case—which is to say
for the carrier's trustee in bankruptcy—conceded at argument that the motor carrier industry is today highly
competitive. But if so, the filed-rate doctrine has lost
its raison d'etre. The classic explanations for the doctrine are from a different world. 'If a mistake in naming
a rate between two given points is to. be accepted as requiring the application of that rate by the carrier, the
great principle of equality in rates, to secure which was
the very purpose and object of the enactment of these
several statutes, might as well be abandoned.' Poor v.
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry., supra, 12 I. C. C.
at 421. 'Stability and equality of rates are more important to commercial interests than reduced rates.' Id., at
422. 'Occasional hardships may result from any inelastic rule of general application. The principle, however,
is vital in our commercial life that there shall be one fixed
and absolutely rigid rate governing the transportation at
a given time of any given commodity between two give
points.' Id., at 423.
"Cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex. Firms in a
competitive market cannot discriminate against weak
shippers, for even the weak shipper has, by definition of
competition, alternative sources of supply to which to
turn if one of his suppliers tries to make a monopoly
profit off him. 'In the more competitive, more flexible
pricing atmosphere created by [deregulation], there is
little likelihood of carriers using a rate misquotation as a
means to discriminate in favor of particular shippers.'
Petition to Institute Rulemaking on Negotiated Motor
Common Carrier Rates, supra, 5 I. C. C. 2d at 625.
And since it is no longer the policy of Congress or the
>ICC to foster monopoly pricing in the motor carrier industry, no public object is served by forcing carriers to
adhere to published price schedules regardless of circumstances. All this the Commission found and persuasively articulated in National Industrial
Transportation
League, supra, 3 I. C. C. 2d at 104-08." Orscheln, 899
F. 2d, at 644-645.
Judge Posner's conclusion that strict mechanical adherence
to the filed rate doctrine produces absurd results and serves
no social purpose, id., at 645, is one that I share. It is likewise shared by the agency charged with administration of the
Act.
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Ill
A few years ago, in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. S37 (1984), we reiterated the importance of giving appropriate deference to an
agency's reasonable interpretation of its governing statute.
Indeed, long before our decision in Chevron, we recognized
that even when faced with a 'long history of the Commission's construction and application of the Act contrary to its
present position," American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. T. &
S. F. R. Co., 387 U. S. 397, 415 (1967), we must defer to the
Commission's interpretation of a statute which it is responsible for administering:
"we agree that the Commission, faced with new developments or in light of reconsideration of the relevant facts
and its mandate, may alter its past interpretation and
overturn past administrative rulings and practice
In fact, although we make no judgment as to the policy
aspects of the Commisssion's action, this kind of flexibility and adaptibility to changing needs and patterns of
transportation is an essential part of the office of a regulatory agency." Id., at 416.
Four Courts of Appeals have expressly invoked Chevron in
the course of upholding the agency action challenged in this
case," but this Court does not deem Chevron—or any other
case involving deference to agency action—worthy of extended discussion. The Court dismisses Chevron by means
of a conclusory assertion that the agency's interpretation is
inconsistent with "the statutory scheme as a whole." Ante,
at 12-13. Insofar as the Court offers any justification for
that result, it does so by relying on cases in which this
Court's action was entirely consistent with the agency's interpretation of the Act.1S The fact that the Court has strictly
enforced the filed rate doctrine in the many cases in which it
served the agency's regulatory purposes provides no justification for enforcing the doctrine in a competitive market in
which it frustrates the agency's attempt to carry out the
plainly expressed intent of Congress.
The Court's failure to adhere today to the teaching of Chevron is compounded by its misplaced reliance on Square D Co.
v. Niagra Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U. S. 409 (1986).
See ante, at 17. In Square D, we adhered to a longstanding
settled construction of § 4 of the Clayton Act that had not
been affected by any subsequent statutory amendment. No
question of agreeing or disagreeing with agency action, or
with an agency's interpretation of a congressional policy
choice, was presented. That case is therefore totally inapplicable to the question presented here. Even less persuasive
authority for the Court's position is Calif on-.ia v. FERC, 495
U. S.
(1990), see ante, at 13, 17, a case in which we upheld an agency interpretation that conformed to longstanding
precedent.
IV
Finally, I must express my emphatic agreement with the
Commission's conclusion, App. to Pet. for Cert. 44a, that an
unreasonable practice would result if the carrier in this case
were rewarded for violating its duty to file a new rate
promptly. There is no evidence of discrimination in this
record; nor is there any reason to believe that any shipper or
any competing motor carrier was harmed by the negotiated
rate or by the failure to file it. The only consequence of tou
Delta Traffic Service, Inc. v. Transtop, Inc.,
F. 2d
,
(CA1 1990); Orscheln Bivs. Truck Lines, Inc. v. ZenilA Electric Corp., 899
F. 2d 642, 646 (CAT 1990); Maislin v. Primary Steel. Inc., 879 F. 2d 400,
406 (CA8 19S9) (case below); West Coast Truck Lines. Inc. v. Weyerhauser
Co., 893 F . 2d 1016, 1023, 1025-1026 (CA9 1990).
u
See, n. 12, supra.
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day's misguided decision is to produce a bonanza for the
bankruptcy bar. "Now that off-tariff pricing is harmless to
the (de)regulatory scheme, the only purpose served by making the statutory' obligation to price in conformity with published tariffs draconian is to provide windfalls for unsecured
creditors in bankruptcy." Orsckeln, 899 F . 2d, at 646.
As Justice Black said more than 30 years ago in similar circumstances, "I am unable to understand why the Court
strains so hard to reach so bad a result." T.LM.E. Inc. v.
United States, 359 U. S. 464, 481 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
The Court's analysis is plausible only if read as a historical
excursus about a statute that no longer exists. Nothing
more than blind adherence to language in cases that have
nothing to do with the present situation supports today's
result.
I respectfully dissent.
T H O M A S M. A U C H I N C L O S S JJ?., Washington, D.C. ( B R I A N L.
T R O I A N O . REA, C R O S S & A U C H I N C L O S S , and D A V I D G.
S P E R R Y , on the briefs) for petitioners; T H O M A S W . M E R R I L L ,
Deputy Solicitor General ( K E N N E T H W. S T A R R , Sol. Gen., M I C H A E L R. D R E E B E N , Asst. to the Sol. Gen., R O B E R T S. B U R K ,
ICC Gen. Counsel, E L L E N D. H A N S O N , ICC Assoc. Gen. Counsel,
and C E C E L I A E. H I G G I N S , I C C attys., on the briefs) for
respondent
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The Illinois Governor issued an executive order instituting a hiring freeze,
whereby state officials are prohibited from hiring any employee, filling
any vacancy, creating any new position, or taking any similar action
without the Governor's "express permission." Petitioners and crossrespondents —an applicant for employment, employees who had been denied promotions or transfers, and former employees who had not been
recalled after layoffs —brought suit in the District Court, alleging that,
by means of the freeze, the Governor was operating a political patronage
system; that they had suffered discrimination in state employment because they had not been Republican Party supporters; and that th.s
discrimination violates the First Amendment. The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a ciaim upon which relief could
be granted. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Noting that Elrod v. Burns, 427 U. S. 507, and Branti v. Finkel, 445
U. S. 507, had found that the patronage practice of discharging pubhc
employees on the basis of their political affiliation violates the First
Amendment, the court held that other patronage practices violate the
Amendment only when they are the "substantial equivalent of a dismissal," i. e., when they would lead reasonable persons to resign. The
court concluded, based on Wygavt v. Jackson Bd. of Education, 476
U. S. 267, that rejecting an employment application did not impose a
hardship comparable to the loss of a job. Thus, it dismissed the hiring
claim, but remanded the others for further proceedings.
Held: The rule of Elrod and Branti extends to promotion, transfer, recall,
and hiring decisions based on party affiliation and support, and petitioners and cross-respondents have stated claims upon which relief may be
granted.
'Together with No. 88-2074, Freeh et al. v. Rutan et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
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K2.) Promotions, transfers, and recalls based on political affiliation or
support a r e an impermissible infringement on public employees' First
Amendment rights. Even though petitioners and cross-respondents
have no legal entitlement to the promotions, transfers, and recalls, the
government may not rely on a basis that infringes their constitutionally
protected interests to deny them these valuable benefits. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 597. Significant penalties are imposed on
those employees who exercise their First Amendment rights. Those
who do not compromise their beliefs stand to lose the considerable increases in pay and job satisfaction attendant to promotions, the shorter
commuting hours and lower maintenance expenses incident to transfers
to more convenient work locations, and even the jobs themselves in the
case of recalls. As in Elrod and Branti, these patronage practices are
not narrowly tailored to serve vital government interests. A government's interest in securing effective employees can be met by discharging, demoting, or transferring persons whose work is deficient, and its
interest in securing employees who will loyally implement its policies can
be adequately served by choosing or dismissing high-level employees on
the basis of their political views. Likewise, the "preservation of the
democratic process" is not furthered by these patronage decisions, since
political parties are nurtured by other, less intrusive and equally effective methods, and since patronage decidedly impairs the elective process
by discouraging public employees' free political expression.
(b) The standard used by the Court of Appeals to measure alleged patronage practices in government employment is unduly restrictive because it fails to recognize that there are deprivations less harsh than
dismissal that nevertheless press state employees and applicants to
conform their beliefs and associations to some state-selected orthdoxy.
ic) Patronage hiring places burdens on free speech and association
sirr..'.ar to those imposed by patronage promotions, transfers, and recalls.
Denial of a state job is a serious privation, since such jobs provide financial, health, and other benefits; since there may be openings with the
State when business in the private sector is slowr; and since there are
occupations for which the government is the sole or major employer.
Under this Court's sustained precedent, conditioning hiring decisions
on political belief and association plainly constitutes an unconstitutional
condition, unless the government has a vital interest in doing so. See,
e. g., Branti, supra, a t 515-516. There is no such government interest
here, for the same reasons that the government lacks justification for
patronage promotions, transfers, and recalls. It is inappropriate to
rely on Wygant to distinguish hiring from dismissal in this context, since
that case was concerned with the least harsh means of remedying past
wrongs and did not question that some remedy was permissible when
there was sufficient evidence of past discrimination. Here, however, it
is unnecessary to consider whether not being hired is less burdensome
than being discharged, because the government is not pressed to do
either on the basis of political affiliation.
S68 F . 2d 943, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
B R E N N A N , J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which W H I T E , MARSHALL. BLACKMUN, and S T E V E N S , J J . , joined.

S T E V E N S , J., filed a con-

curring opinion. SCALIA, J . , filed a dissenting opinion in which R E H N QUIST. C. J . , and K E N N E D Y , J., joined, and in which O'CONNOR, J., joined
as to Parts II and III.

JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
To :he victor belong only those spoils that may be constitutionally obtained. Elrod v. Burns. 427 U. S. 347 (1976),
and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U. S. 507 (1980), decided that the
Firs: Amendment forbids government officials to discharge
or threaten to discharge public employees solely for not being
supporters of the political party in power, unless party affiliation :s an appropriate requirement for the position involved.
Today we are asked to decide the constitutionality of several
related political patronage practices—whether promotion,
transfer, recall, and hiring decisions involving low-level public employees may be constitutionally based on party affiliation and support. We hold that they may not.
I
The petition and cross-petition before us arise from a lawsuit protesting certain employment policies and practices in-

